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erent national in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1. Introduction
Ination dierentials often characterize large currency areas, such as the Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or the United States. Indeed, as
stressed by the European Central Bank (ECB), under certain conditions these
dierentials may also play a useful role as an equilibrating adjustment process
(cf. ECB, 2005). However, such an equilibrating adjustment process requires
the stability of the ination dierentials. In the context of stochastic processes,
and in the presence of series which exhibit a unit root, this requires that the
Euro-area ination and the national ination rate should be driven by a com-
mon stochastic trend, i.e. the ination dierential should behave as a stationary
variable.
In reality, one expects an even stronger condition to be satised, namely
that the national rates of ination converge or, better, gravitate around the
aggregate rate of ination of the whole area. In other words, that despite
temporary deviation, the Euro-area ination is an anchor for the ination of
member countries.
In this paper we rst establish a set of conditions under which convergence
is satised and then we test if these conditions are met for a group of Euro-
area countries. We show that in a cointegration framework the requirement
is not only for the existence of a stable one-for-one long-run relation between
Euro-area ination and national ination, but also for long-run unidirectional
causality running from the rst variable to the second one.
Moreover, if these conditions are met then it is possible to separate a per-
manent from a transitory shock by imposing a contemporary causal structure
with the Euro-area ination ordered rst (cf. Ribba, 2003). The important
implications are that, in this case, (a) only ination shocks aecting the whole
area may exert permanent eects on the local ination rates; (b) it is legitimate
to interpret the EMU average rate of ination as a long-run predictor of the
national rates.
Unfortunately, in the empirical investigation, covering the period from 1999
to 2011, we nd that only for a small number of countries is the set of restrictions
not rejected by data.
However, an interesting and somehow unexpected result of the investigation
is that Italy belongs to the group of countries showing convergence of its in-
ation rate. As far as the other two biggest EMU countries are concerned, a
convergence result for the ination rate also characterizes the French economy,
whereas an opposite conclusion holds for Germany.
In the nal part of this paper, in order to have a comparison with another
important currency area, we extend the investigation to the USA. The con-
clusion for the US economy seems more encouraging since, analyzing the four
great US regions, Mid-West, North East, South and West, we nd that three of
them exhibit converging results of the inationary dynamics and that only for
West is the stationarity of the ination dierential rejected by data. Further,
ination dierentials in the US economy exhibit lower volatility with respect to
the Eurozone economy.
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A recent survey on the subject of ination dierentials in the Euro area
is provided by De Haan (2010). Given the existence of persistent ination
dierentials one might wonder if this poses risks for the survival of the currency
area and, moreover, if the problem should be tackled by the central bank. On
this last question Angeloni and Ehrmann (2007) conclude that the ECB, by
keeping a low level of ination in the whole area, also helps to avoid widening
dierentials in the Eurozone.
A somewhat dierent conclusion has recently been reached by Fendel and
Frenkel (2009), since the authors nd evidence of attention paid by the ECB to
ination dierentials among countries. Further, they maintain that considering
this variable might have induced the central bank to a less restrictive stance
than required by the macroeconomic conditions of the Euro area in the rst
years of activity.
It is worth pointing out that the main aim of this paper is to investigate
the existence of explosive behavior of the ination dierentials among Eurozone
countries, by updating the evidence to the end of 2011, rather than to explore
causes and consequences of the ination dierential dynamics themselves. Nev-
ertheless, there are some clear policy implications. For example, as for the
conduct of monetary policy, in the presence of transitory deviations in national
ination from the aggregate Euro-area path, there is no reason for the central
bank to take into account the dierentials but, of course, the conclusion might
be quite dierent in the presence of permanent deviations.
Moreover, it is important to observe that those Eurozone countries showing a
(sort of) virtuous divergence in their inationary dynamics, i.e. persistent lower
ination with respect to the Eurozone average rate, also feature a conspicuous
surplus in their current account. Symmetrically, countries which exhibit diverg-
ing paths as a consequence of higher ination rates are generally aected by wide
decits in their current account. This seems to suggest that over the next years
the goal of recovering macroeconomic stability in the Euro area will require a
more cooperating approach, such that the process of enhancing competitiveness
through structural reforms by the Mediterranean countries be accompanied by
an expansion of domestic demand in Northern European countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briey review some results
of (part of) the literature concerning the ination dierentials in the Euro area.
Section 3 presents some facts concerning the ination dierentials in the
Eurozone and in the USA in the last 13 years.
The econometric approach of the paper, based on cointegrated VARs, is
instead presented in section 4. In particular, we establish a set of conditions
which allows the EMU average ination rate to be interpreted as a long-run
predictor of the national rates.
In section 5 an empirical investigation comprising 12 euro area countries
members is undertaken. Our results show that the annual ination rate of the
majority of countries, more precisely nine out of twelve, has a diverging path.
Instead, Belgium, France and Italy exhibit an ination path converging to the
EMU average annual rate. For these countries we also recover the structural
shocks associated with the joint, bivariate dynamics of Eurozone ination and
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national ination. In particular, we nd that the local ination shock is not
persistent and, moreover, it exerts only a transitory eect on the variables.
One might wonder if these results are so dierent from those characterizing
another important currency area, the USA, and hence in section 6, we extend
the investigation to the four great US regions.
Section 7 concludes and some policy implications for the Eurozone are drawn.
2. Ination dierentials: open questions and literature summary
Persistent and large ination dierentials among countries may pose serious
risks for the survival of a monetary union. Two important problems are related,
respectively, to the potential, destabilizing eects associated with the monetary
policy conduct by the central bank, and with the changes induced in the relative
competitive position of the countries members.
Indeed, if the ECB sets the level of the short-term interest rate looking
at the average ination rate of the whole area, those countries experiencing an
expansionary phase and with an ination rate systematically above the average,
will receive a pro-cyclical, and hence undesiderable, impulse from the monetary
policy choices on aggregate demand, via the contraction in the real interest
rates1. It is important to stress that this situation has characterized a group of
countries, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, in the rst decade of
EMU. For example, as shown in table 1, Spain2 experienced an ination rate
above the EMU average for 87 consecutive months, between January 2001 and
August 2008.
As far as the second problem is concerned, the working of a monetary union
of course relies on the adoption of a single currency for the member countries.
However, persistent ination dierentials will cause a systematic depreciation
in the real exchange rate for countries with ination below the EMU average
and, on the opposite side, real appreciation for those countries with ination
above the EMU average. Hence, other things being equal, the last group of
countries will experience persistent foreign trade decits and a growing external
debt3. Once again, this situation has characterized the above mentioned group
of countries.
In particular, if we compare Greece and Germany, the two countries, respec-
tively, with the highest and the lowest ination rate in the Euro area, we note
that the rst country exhibited an average ination rate of 3.2 per cent while
1The risk of perverse pro-cyclical dynamics in a xed exchange rate regime, such as the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), was forcefully raised by Alan Walters in the
1980s. See, for example, Walters (1988).
2In a recent article, Arghyrou and Gadea (2012) presented econometric evidence on the
incompatibility between the interest rates set by the ECB over the period 1999 - 2007 with the
Spanish macroeconomic fundamentals which, according to the authors, would have required
higher interest rates.
3An interesting result obtained by Honohan and Lane (2003) concerns the evidence that in
the rst years of euro an important factor inuencing ination dierentials in the European
economies is represented by exchange rate eects. On the other hand, the authors nd evidence
of a limited role exerted by the Balassa-Samuelson eect in explaining ination dierentials.
4
the second had an average ination of 1.56 per cent. Moreover, Greece was
characterized by 150 consecutive months, from 1999:1 to 2011:6, with ination
above the average, whereas Germany had 97 consecutive months with an ina-
tion rate below the EMU average, between January 1999 and January 2007 (cf.
Table 1). Clearly, this wide and persistent ination dierential is, at the same
time, an indicator and a source of macroeconomic problems.
Some policy implications associated with the presence of persistent ina-
tion dierentials are discussed at length in a recent article by De Haan (2010).
The author also provides a survey of theoretical and empirical contributions
concerning the subject of ination dierentials in the Euro area.
Pirovano and Van Poeck (2011) test for the stability of ination dierentials.
The authors nd that for the period from 1999 to 2006 data do not reject the
hypothesis of convergence for the majority of countries. On the other hand, by
considering the whole sample period 1999 - 2010, there is evidence of persistent
divergence in inationary dynamics for the Euro-area countries. Although the
authors conclude that the inationary dynamics are more unstable in the Euro
area in recent years, i.e. during the years characterized by the Great Recession,
it is worth stressing that it is dicult to draw sound conclusions about the evo-
lution of ination dierentials when such limited sample periods are considered.
A paper by Fendel and Frenkel (2009) explores, instead, the hypothesis that
ination dierentials may have played a role in shaping the ECB's monetary
policy conduct in the last decade. Their main conclusion, based on the estima-
tion of Taylor rules for the Eurozone, is that the ECB may have taken a less
restrictive stance aiming to avoid risks of deation in member countries expe-
riencing low ination. It is worth noting, that if this conclusion is correct then
the pro-cyclical eect induced by monetary policy choices in the high ination
countries is even stronger.
In another relevant paper in this area of research, Angeloni and Ehrmann
(2007) take a more optimistic stance in evaluating the role of monetary policy
in the currency area. The authors maintain that the central bank, by keeping
the whole area in a low ination environment, also helps to reduce the ination
dierentials.
Beck et al. (2009) have analyzed the dynamics of regional ination in a
group of Euro-area countries. They aim to identify the empirical relevance of
the national factors in explaining the ination dierentials over the period from
1996 to 2004. The main conclusion of the investigation is that local, structural
factors, such as limited competition in labor and good markets, have played a
dominant role in explaining the variability of ination.
In a recent paper, Altissimo et al. (2011) study the underlying factors of
ination dierentials in a currency area. On the empirical ground, they nd
two main results: (a) persistent ination dierentials aect the euro area; (b)
a pre-eminent role, in explaining the evolution of the ination dierentials, is
played by the dierent responses of Eurozone countries to common, Euro-area
shocks.
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3. Some simple facts concerning ination dierentials
Tables 1 and 2 summarize some descriptive statistical information related to the
ination dierentials in the Euro area and in the US economy for the period
1999:1 - 2011:12. The ination rate for the Eurozone is the year-on-year rate of
change of the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI) and, for the countries
considered in the investigation, the ination is based on the annual rate of change
of the national consumer price index (CPI). On the annual rate of change of the
CPI ination are also based the statistics for the USA4.
In particular, table 1 and 2 collect some data concerning the ination dier-
ential, dened as i   , where  is the average currency zone ination, and
i is the ination of the specic country member (or region, in the case of the
USA).
Clearly, in the last 13 years, a group of countries in the Eurozone, including
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, has exhibited a wide and
positive dierential with respect to the average Euro-area ination.
Instead, a specular situation characterizes another group of countries, namely
Austria, France, Finland and Germany, with a lower ination rate than the Eu-
rozone average. Thus, given an average ination rate for the Euro area of 2.013
per cent, for the sample period considered, Germany was the country with the
lowest ination rate, with an average value of 1.578 percent, whereas Greece
was the country with the highest ination rate and an average value of 3.195.
Clearly, the cumulative eect of this dierential, over the sample period consid-
ered, is quite remarkable.
Although there is a dierent level of aggregation for the US macro areas
and hence it is dicult to make fully sensible comparison with the Eurozone
evolution5 of the ination dierentials, nevertheless it is worth noticing that, as
a whole, ination dierentials in the USA are more concentrated around a zero
mean and, moreover, show lower volatility.
Insert table 1 about here
Insert table 2 about here
4. The approach of the paper
In the presence of dierence stationary variables, the convergence of national
ination rates toward the global, Euro-area ination rate requires the ination
dierentials to be a stationary variable. More precisely, a systemic, desirable
4For the Euro-area countries, the series are taken from Eurostat. Data concerning the USA
are instead taken from FRED at the St. Louis FED Web site.
5The four US regions, both for economic strength and population size, are more comparable
with the group of big European countries, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.
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property for the currency area is that the dierent national rates would gravitate
around the EMU average ination. Hence, divergence should be only a short-
run, transitory phenomenon.
Our strategy is to establish rst a set of conditions under which the long-run
convergence is satised and then to undertake an empirical investigation for a
group of Euro-area countries.
To this end, let us assume that the Eurozone annual ination rate, given by
 = (ln(P t )  ln(P t 12))  100, behaves as an I(1) variable.
If we assume that also the year-on-year ination rate of the generic member
country, i, i = (ln(Pit)  ln(Pit 12))  100, is an I(1) variable, then their joint
dynamic has the following reduced-form Wold representation:

t
it

=

C11(L) C12(L)
C21(L) C22(L)

1t
2t

[1]
where  is the rst dierence operator and L is the lag operator, with
C(0) = I. t = (1t; 2t)
0 is the (2x1) vector of reduced-form disturbances such
that E(t) = 0 and E(t
0
t) = 
.
We state that the ination rate of country i converges to the ination rate
of the Euro area if the following set of conditions (cf. Ribba, 2003) is satised:
(i) the matrix of long-run multipliers, C(1), has reduced rank 1, i.e. Euro-area
and national ination are cointegrated.
(ii) the cointegrated vector has the form (1; 1)0, i.e. the ination dierential
is a stationary stochastic process.
(iii) There is unidirectional long-run causality which goes from Euro-area in-
ation to national ination, i.e. the error-correction term does not enter the
equation of the Euro-area ination. The implication is that the burden of the
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium relies on the national ination rate.
If this set of conditions is satised, then the EMU average ination rate is a
long-run predictor of the national ination rate since, in this case, the following
results hold:
lim
h!1
@Et(it+h)
@1t
6= 0 [2]
lim
h!1
@Et(it+h)
@2t
= 0 [3]
For, the implication is that the conditional expectation Et(it+h), for h
which goes to innity, depends only on innovations in Euro-area ination.
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Moreover, if the set of conditions from (i) to (iii) is satised, then there exists
the following Error Correction Model representation:
t = A11(L)

t 1 +A12(L)it 1 + 1t [4]
it = A21(L)

t 1 +A22(L)it 1   2(t 1   it 1) + 2t [5]
since conditions (ii) and (iii) imply that  the (2x1) vector of cointegra-
tion coecients is given by  = (1; 1)0 and  the (2x1) vector of adjustment
coecients is given by  = (0; 2)
0.
Note that the set of conditions from (i) to (iii) also allows  to be identied
as the trend component of i, since the restrictions meet all the conditions re-
quired by the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) Permanent-Transitory decomposition
(P - T) in cointegrated systems.
Thus, in order to generate a Permanent-Transitory decomposition, the fur-
ther condition C12(L) = 0 equivalent to A12(L) = 0, i.e. national ination does
not Granger-cause EMU average ination, is not required. In other words, since
we search for conditions which ensure the long-run convergence, then Granger
non-causality at all frequencies is not necessary.
An important and further step consists in recovering the structural distur-
bances aecting the variables. In particular, it is possible to obtain a separation
between the permanent and the transitory shock by observing that the condi-
tion of weak exogeneity of the Euro-area ination implies that a contemporary
causal ordering, with Euro-area ination ordered rst, produces the following
results:
lim
h!1
@t+h
@1t
= lim
h!1
@it+h
@1t
6= 0 [6]
Moreover, both the contemporaneous and the long-run response of Euro-area
ination to a local ination shock exhibit the following result:
@t
@2t
= lim
h!1
@t+h
@2t
= lim
h!1
@it+h
@2t
= 0 [7]
Where t = (1t; 2t)
0 is the (2x1) vector of structural disturbances obtained
by the Cholesky orthogonalization of the shocks6. The related structural VAR
6Hence, this is a case of equivalence between short-run and long-run identifying restrictions
in bivariate cointegrated VAR models. There is a small but growing literature on this sub-
ject. See, among others, Cochrane (1994), Ribba (2003) and Fisher-Huh (2007). Some new
equivalence results, for VAR models including both dierence-stationary and trend-stationary
variables, have recently been proposed by Keating (2009).
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representation is given by:

t
it

=

H11(L) H12(L)
H21(L) H22(L)

1t
2t

[8]
where H(L) = C(L)H(0), t = H(0)
 1t and E(t0t) = I. Notice that H(0) is
the unique lower triangular matrix (Cholesky factor) such that H(0)H(0)0 = 
.
In words: in the presence of an unexpected increase at date t of the Euro-area
ination rate, the long-run forecast of both variables will gradually move towards
a higher value; instead, in the presence of an increase of national ination at date
t, holding contemporaneously xed Euro-area ination, the long-run forecast of
both the variables will be unchanged; however, an upward revision for short
horizons might be possible7.
A recent application of this methodological approach is due to Ribba (2011),
where a criticism of the Fama interpretation of the Fisher eect is provided and,
moreover, ination is interpreted as a long-run predictor of short-term nominal
interest rates, whereas the converse does not hold. In another recent paper,
Paul and Ramachandran (2011) investigate the role of the currency equivalent
monetary aggregate as a leading indicator of ination for India in a cointegration
framework. They nd that a one-for-one long-run relation between the two
variables is not rejected by data and then they test for the presence of long-run
unidirectional causality running from the monetary aggregate to the ination.
The authors conclude that also this restriction is not rejected by data.
5. An empirical investigation for the Eurozone economy
In this section we present the results of the empirical investigation concerning
the dynamics of the ination dierentials in the Euro area. For the countries
included, we test for the existence of an equilibrium long-run relation between
the Eurozone ination and the national ination. The sample period covered
is 1999:1 - 2011:12. In a second step, if on the basis of Johansen's trace and
lambda max tests the presence of cointegration is not rejected by data, we
also test for the joint restriction of a one-for-one long-run relation between the
variables and for the exogeneity of the Euro-area ination. Thus we test for the
set of restrictions dened in section 4 that, if met, allows the Eurozone overall
ination to be identied as the permanent component of the national ination
rates and hence as the long-run predictor of the specic country ination.
The results of this investigation are summarized8 in table 3.
Insert table 3 about here
7Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that the results collected in equations 2-7 hold only in
the case where conditions from (i) to (iii) are satised.
8In order to save space, both in this section and in the next one, we do not report the
detailed results concerning the cointegration tests and the analysis of the cointegration space.
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The conclusion is that the instability of ination dierentials characterizes
9 out of the 12 countries considered in this investigation. Instead, the three
countries which exhibit both stationarity of the dierential and exogeneity of
the Eurozone ination are Belgium, France and Italy.
We have also tested, for the group of countries with converging path of
inationary dynamics, the presence of unidirectional Granger causality at all
frequencies: we nd that only the joint dynamic of Euro-area ination and
French ination shows the existence of bidirectional causality at the business
cycle frequencies whereas for Italy and Belgium the national ination does not
Granger causes the currency area, overall ination9.
Figures from 1 to 3 present the impulse-response functions, with the 90 per
cent condence bounds10, for the three member countries with a stable ination
dierential. It is worth recalling that we recover the structural shocks by im-
posing a Wold causal chain with Eurozone ination ordered rst for the three
estimated bivariate VARs. We have also shown in section 4 that in presence of
cointegration and with the variable ordered rst in the causal ordering which is
weakly exogenous, this structural representation allows the separation of a per-
manent from a transitory shock. In other words, in this case there is equivalence
between short-run (contemporaneous) and long-run identifying restrictions.
Indeed, as shown in the gures, the national ination shock exerts only
a transitory eect on both the Euro-area and the national ination rate. In
particular, in the case of Italy and Belgium, the response of Eurozone ination
to a local shock is not signicant at all horizons. A slightly dierent result is
obtained for France, since in response to a French ination shock there is a
signicant increase in Eurozone ination for some periods. Moreover, for all the
three Euro-area countries showing convergence in the inationary dynamics, it
requires around two years for the transitory shock to vanish.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Insert Figure 2 about here
Insert Figure 3 about here
As far as the Eurozone permanent shock ination is concerned, it drives the
evolution of both national and Euro-area ination from medium to long run.
More precisely, it plays a dominant role for national ination at low frequencies
9As shown in Granger and Lin (1995), in the context of bivariate cointegrated VAR models,
if the error-correction term does not enter the equation of the rst variable, i.e. in our
framework if the Eurozone ination is the weakly exogenous variable of the dynamical system,
then the conclusion is that the second variable (the national ination in our context) does not
Granger cause the rst variable in the long run (at frequency zero).
10These asymptotic condence bounds are built on the analytical formulae presented in
Amisano and Giannini (1997).
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whereas, for the Eurozone ination, there is a pre-eminent role of the permanent
shock at all frequencies.
6. Extending the analysis to the US economy
This section is devoted to the study of ination dierentials for the US economy.
In particular, we consider a set of bivariate VARs including the ination rate
of the four great US regions (Mid-West, North-East, South and West) vis-a-
vis the overall US ination rate. Table 4 shows that three out of four areas
exhibit cointegration and stability of ination dierentials. Moreover, in these
three areas there is gravitation of the regional rate around the US ination rate.
Only for West is the existence of a long-run equilibrium relation rejected by
data for the sample period considered11.
Insert table 4 about here
As shown in gures from 4 to 6, the local ination shock exerts only a small,
temporary eect for the US ination rate. Further, the transitory shock does not
show persistent eects also on the regional ination rates, since it becomes not
signicant after six months in the Mid-West and after around eighteen months
both in the North-East and in the South.
As a whole, the dynamic shape of the impulse-response functions is quite
similar to those seen for the Euro-area countries. This not surprising since we
have selected the group of regions which shows convergence of ination to the
overall ination of the currency area.
Rogers (2007) studied the convergence of prices across European and US
cities from 1990 to 2004. The author's investigation shows a signicant re-
duction of dispersion of traded goods in the Euro area and, more generally,
evidence of price level convergence. Rogers also emphasizes the similarity of
results concerning the Eurozone and the US economy.
However, our investigation, covering the more recent period and conducted
at a regional rather than at city level, conrms the presence of convergence in
the ination rates only for the USA.
Cecchetti et al. (2002) also conclude that there is convergence in the price
level index among US cities. Nevertheless, the rate of convergence is slow since
they estimate a half-life of convergence of about nine years. It is worth empha-
sizing that the authors consider a quite dierent period of investigation, from
1918 to 1995.
Insert Figure 4 about here
11In order to allow comparability with the results obtained for the Euro area, we have chosen
the same sample period, 1999:1 - 2011:12.
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Insert Figure 5 about here
Insert Figure 6 about here
A nal remark concerns the conclusion reached by Pirovano and van Poeck
(2011) according to which the Great Recession has worsened the ination dier-
entials in the Euro area. Indeed, if this point is correct, then one may conclude
that the recent economic crisis has not exerted the same eect, i.e. widening
ination dierentials, in the US economy.
7. Conclusions and (Some) Policy Implications
The empirical investigation conducted in this paper, covering the period from
1999 to 2011 and based on structural VECM, has shown that the Euro-area
ination can be interpreted as the stochastic trend component, and hence as
a long-run predictor of the national ination rates, only for a small number of
Euro-area countries. In other words, the dominant picture in the evolution of
Eurozone ination dierentials is one of divergence. Exceptions are represented
by France, Italy and Belgium.
Comparison of the Euro area with the other important currency area, i.e.
the USA, reveals that there is a greater convergence in the US regional ination
dynamics, since three out of the four great areas which compose the monetary
union exhibit stationarity in the ination dierentials. Moreover, the volatility
in ination dierentials is lower in the USA.
However, with regard to the Eurozone economy, we stress that a positive
conclusion of convergence of ination dynamics regards France and Italy, two of
the biggest EMU economies, considering that their GDP represents about one
third of the overall euro area aggregate output.
The investigation also shows that Germany, the most important European
economy, exhibited an ination rate that diverged from the Eurozone average
ination and, in particular, was systematically below the Eurozone average in
the rst 13 years of the euro. It is also worth stressing that the German average
ination rate was below but, after all, not so close to 2 per cent! Of course,
while this can be seen as a virtue from the point of view of the national economy,
at the same time it represents a problem for the currency zone as a whole,
since Germany, also through its low ination rate, has signicantly increased its
relative competitiveness.
In our opinion there are some important policy implications stemming from
the results obtained in the present research. In particular, as far as the conduct
of monetary policy is concerned, it seems that given the wide and persistent
heterogeneity of the national ination rates in the Euro Area, which mirrors
the heterogeneity in the national macroeconomic conditions, the ECB should
give more weight to the ination dierentials. More precisely, we believe that
the central bank should also consider the possibility of selective interventions in
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specic countries in the case where a persistent ination dierential signals the
presence of deep macroeconomic imbalances. As an example, possible quanti-
tative restrictions for the credit expansion in countries like Ireland and Spain
over the period 2005-2007 might have prevented, or at least mitigated, the de-
velopment of harmful housing bubbles.
There is little doubt that for the diverging countries characterized by higher
ination and aected by a persistent current account decit, recovering com-
petitiveness will require the prosecution of the structural reforms aiming to
strengthen competition in the dierent markets and to increase the potential
output. However, as recently stressed by Noren (2012), although a national
strategy oriented towards internal devaluation, i.e. based on a signicant re-
duction in the cost of labour, would allow international competitiveness to be
regained, it is dicult to achieve this goal since the high unemployment rate
typically associated with this strategy of devaluation will induce a negative re-
action in the majority of the citizens of the country involved.
Indeed, one might wonder, also on the basis of the results obtained in this
paper, if there is room for a more active role by Germany and the other countries
of northern Europe, (and also to a lesser extent by France) in the adjustment
process towards a more sustainable equilibrium in the EMU. Indeed, recent
macroeconomic projections show that the European recession will not stop in
2013 and, moreover, that the possible recovery in subsequent years will be, at
its best, quite anemic. Further, it is now clear that also for Germany it will
be very dicult to avoid a period of stagnation, given current macroeconomic
policies. Thus, one of the unavoidable items among the fundamental ones in the
agenda would seem to be a prolonged period, from two to three years, in which
Germany and the other Eurozone countries with low ination and which exhibit
a current account surplus would adopt macroeconomic policies aimed at increas-
ing domestic demand. These policies would allow these countries to preserve
full employment and, not less important, might help to mitigate the deation
and strong recession which the Mediterranean countries are undergoing.
It is worth recalling that Germany showed a sort of virtuous divergence in
the rst decade of EMU, in terms of a markedly lower ination rate with respect
to the EMU average. Hence, if such expansionary policies were to produce, at
least for some years, a higher national ination rate than the average of the
Eurozone, this one might exert a stabilizing role for the currency union.
In another recent article, published in this Journal (cf. Pagano et al. 2011)
and dealing with the global economic crisis, it is argued that had China and other
emerging countries with persistent surplus in the current account expanded do-
mestic demands in the 2000s, this choice in combination with a tighter monetary
policy in the USA might have helped to mitigate global macroeconomic imbal-
ances. The lesson for the current European situation is that a contribution
to a rebalancing of the aggregate demand from economies with savings glut
in the Eurozone is needed in conjunction with the eort to enhance potential
growth through structural reforms in countries with low growth, such as Italy
and France.
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Table 1. Statistics on ination dierentials in the Euro area, 1999 - 2011.
Country Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. Consecutive months
above (*) or below (**)
the EMU average ination
Austria -0.144 -0.131 1.248 -0.965 0.448 36** (01:11 - 04:10)
Belgium 0.121 0.054 1.773 -1.538 0.673 26** (02:3 - 04:4)
France -0.238 -0.250 0.555 -0.720 0.288 49** (99:1 - 03:1)
Finland -0.147 -0.021 1.807 -2.442 0.963 68** (02:5 - 07:12)
Germany -0.435 -0.408 0.514 -1.194 0.354 97** (99:1 - 07:1)
Greece 1.182 1.107 3.923 -1.092 0.767 150* (99:1 - 11:6)
Ireland 0.371 0.446 3.615 -4.154 1.767 63* (99:1 - 04:3)
Italy 0.228 0.233 0.993 -0.601 0.343 25* (02:4 - 04:4)
Luxembourg 0.639 0.779 2.495 -2.261 0.834 34* (03:12 - 06:9)
Netherland 0.133 -0.211 3.033 -1.626 1.092 40* (00:5 - 03:8)
Portugal 0.494 0.499 2.855 -1.500 0.933 54* (00:4 - 04:9)
Spain 0.792 0.932 1.750 -0.909 0.598 87* (01:9 - 08:11)
Note: For each country statistics are presented concerning the variable i   , i.e. the
dierence between the member country ination, i, and the EMU average ination, 
.
The last column indicates, for each country, the maximum number of consecutive
months in which the national ination exhibited values above or below the Euro-area
ination rate.
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Table 2. Statistics on ination dierentials in the USA 1999 - 2011.
Country Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Consecutive months
above (*) or below (**)
the USA average ination
Mid-West -0.178 -0.167 0.673 -1.420 0.360 30** (03:3 - 05:8)
North East 0.206 0.196 1.210 -0.587 0.353 52* (01:11 - 06:2)
South -0.025 -0.019 0.597 -0.662 0.275 30** (00:5 - 02:10)
West 0.021 -0.103 1.138 -0.726 0.474 41** (02:10 - 06:2)
Note: See note in table 1.
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Table 3. Summary of the results for the joint dynamics of EMU average
ination rate and national ination rates.
Country rank C(1) = 1  = (1; 1)0 C12(L) = 0
 = (0; 2)
0
Belgium yes yes yes
France yes yes no
Finland no
Germany no
Greece no
Ireland no
Italy yes yes yes
Luxembourg no
Netherland no
Portugal no
Spain no
Sweden no
Note: The notation is based on equations from (1) to (5) of section 4. A reduced-form
bivariate VAR model, including Euro-area ination and national ination, was estimated
for each country. The rank of the long-run matrix, C(1), and the restrictions on the cointe-
grating vectors and on the vectors of loading are based on the Johansen (1991) framework.
The null of a vector of adjustment coecients (0; 2) implies testing for unidirectional
long-run causality. In the last column, the null of C12(L) = 0 tests for unidirectional
causality at all frequencies (Granger-causality).
18
Table 4. Summary of the results for the ination dierentials in the USA.
Area rank C(1) = 1  = (1; 1)0 C12(L) = 0
 = (0; 2)
0
Mid-West yes yes no
North East yes yes yes
South yes yes yes
West no
Note: The notation is based on equations from (1) to (5) of section 4. A reduced-form
bivariate VAR model, including the US ination and the selected regional ination, was
estimated for each region. See also note in table 3.
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Figure 1 Impulse Response Functions: France
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Figure 4 Impulse Response Functions: Mid-West
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Figure 5 Impulse Response Functions: North East
24
RESP. OF US_INFL TO  US_INFL
SIZE=  10%
20 40 60 80 100
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
RESP. OF SOUTH_INFL TO  US_INFL
SIZE=  10%
20 40 60 80 100
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
RESP. OF US_INFL TO  SOUTH_INFL
SIZE=  10%
20 40 60 80 100
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
RESP. OF SOUTH_INFL TO  SOUTH_INFL
SIZE=  10%
20 40 60 80 100
-0.50
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
Figure 6 Impulse Response Functions: South
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